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DEPLOYING THE SECRET POLICE: THE USE OF 
ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
Jessica Gabel Cino* 
	
Algorithms saturate our lives today; from curated song lists to 
recommending “friends” and news feeds, they factor into some of the 
most human aspects of decision-making, tapping into preferences 
based on an ever-growing amount of data. Regardless of whether the 
algorithm pertains to routing you around traffic jams or finding your 
next dinner, there is little regulation and even less transparency 
regarding just how these algorithms work. Paralleling this societal 
adoption, the criminal justice system now employs algorithms in 
some of the most important aspects of investigation and decision-
making. The lack of oversight is abundantly apparent in the criminal 
justice system where various algorithm-based tools are now routinely 
deployed to investigate, prosecute, and sentence offenders. In the 
absence of suitable safeguards, decisions affecting life and liberty are 
contained in an impenetrable “black box.”1 
I.   Overview 
Police agencies, crime labs, courts, and corrections departments 
around the world use algorithms in a wide range of tools: facial 
recognition programs, probabilistic DNA genotyping, and bail and 
sentencing software. These proprietary tools are big business: law 
enforcement and government agencies license or buy the software 
                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank my two intrepid 
research assistants, Michael Duffey and Erik Badia, for their heavy lifting in bringing this article to 
publication. 
 1. The phrase “black box” commonly refers to the actions companies take to keep the source code 
containing the algorithm and related programming features secret. See Tom Simonite, AI Experts Want 
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from the private companies that purvey this technology—often on the 
promise of reduced budget expenditures by removing hours of human 
work. Once the software is installed, algorithmic outputs are 
delivered to the operator. For most software running sophisticated 
algorithms, the end user—often the government—had no hand in 
writing the code or developing the ultimate product. Thus, a private 
company owns the software and maintains a fist-hold on the source 
code (which contains the algorithm), while the purchaser (including 
the operator) has little to no knowledge as to how the algorithm 
makes decisions or draws conclusions.2 This imbalance effectively 
means that the software’s end users lack the ability to see how the 
software makes decisions. This lack of transparency, in turn, leads to 
serious consequences. 
A.   Science in the Courtroom 
In the last twenty years, science (in particular, forensic science) 
has become a mainstay in the criminal justice system. Thousands of 
guilty defendants have been convicted with the help of forensic 
techniques.3 In theory, scientific expert testimony must meet certain 
standards of reliability before being admitted in court. In federal 
                                                                                                             
 2. Some software relies on a machine learning platform. See, e.g., Ben Schreck et al., Getting Value 
from Machine Learning Isn’t About Fancier Algorithms—It’s About Making It Easier to Use, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/getting-value-from-machine-learning-isnt-about-
fancier-algorithms-its-about-making-it-easier-to-use [https://perma.cc/3DXW-BV44]. The source code 
defines the machine learning algorithm, which then compiles the actual algorithm on prior input and 
converts it to output. Id. For example, in Google Maps, the source code doesn’t code the route; instead, 
the source code accumulates data inputs from millions of users and forms a predictive model (an 
algorithmically generated algorithm) to route the driver to the desired destination. See generally Ravi 
Sharma, How Google Maps Gets Its Remarkably Accurate Real-Time Traffic Data, GADGETS360 (Mar. 
2, 2017), https://gadgets.ndtv.com/apps/features/how-google-maps-gets-its-remarkably-accurate-real-
time-traffic-data-1665385 [https://perma.cc/GN28-WWHG]. 
 3. Jessica D. Gabel & Margaret D. Wilkinson, Good Science Gone Bad: How the Criminal Justice 
System Can Redress the Impact of Flawed Forensics, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1002 (2008). At the same 
time, the Innocence Project estimates that forensic evidence with little to no probative value caused or 
contributed to a wrongful conviction in at least eighty DNA exoneration cases the Project has evaluated. 
Id.; see also DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/3GM8-
CK7W] (last visited May 15, 2018) (reporting that 45% of the Innocence Project’s 356 DNA 
exonerations “[i]nvolved misapplication of forensic science”). 
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court and some state courts, the Daubert standard governs the 
admissibility of such testimony.4 Under Daubert, a judge acts as a 
gatekeeper and may admit scientific evidence as long as it is both 
relevant and reliable.5 Other state courts have continued to follow the 
earlier Frye standard, under which scientific evidence “must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs” to be admissible.6 Despite these 
roadblocks to admissibility, courts have routinely accepted much of 
the so-called science underlying forensic testing with little, if any, 
inquiry.7 Many forensic techniques, such as hair and fiber analysis, 
toolmark comparison, and fingerprint analysis, rely upon little more 
than a matching of patterns wherein a forensic analyst compares a 
known sample to a questioned sample and makes the highly 
subjective determination that the two samples originated from the 
same source. Indeed, what passes as “science” plays a prominent role 
in many cases because of its easy availability. 
Because of this, forensic science’s armor has some cracks in it. For 
example, in 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) formally admitted that almost every 
examiner in the FBI’s microscopic hair unit gave misleading, 
exaggerated, or otherwise flawed testimony in criminal cases 
between 1972 and 1999.8 A cloud of doubt now hangs over cases 
involving hair evidence, but these cases are not alone. A committee 
at the National Academy of Science (NAS) concluded in 2009 that 
“no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity 
to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a 
connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.”9 
                                                                                                             
 4. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 142 
(Cal. 2007). 
 7. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 263–64 (Ky. 1999). 
 8. Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 
2015), http://wapo.st/1OrujpH?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term=.17d035df6e5a [https://perma.cc/2LN4-
JX5E]. 
 9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009). In recent years, studies of certain forensic fields have 
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Simply put, the criminal justice system is “sending people to jail 
based on bogus science.”10 
The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
(PCAST) released a report on forensic science in September 2016.11 
While the Council acknowledged the ongoing efforts to improve 
forensic sciences after the 2009 NAS report, its report also 
emphasized the significant problems in multiple disciplines of 
forensic sciences.12 The PCAST report focused on pattern 
identification evidence—evidence that requires interpretation by an 
examiner.13 The main question asked by PCAST is whether pattern 
identification evidence is supported by reproducible research.14 
PCAST suggested a discipline of forensic science must satisfy two 
types of validity.15 The first is foundational validity, which means 
that the discipline is based on research and studies that are accurate 
and reproducible.16 The second type of validity is applied validity, 
which means that the method is reliably applied in practice.17 Among 
the disciplines of forensic science PCAST examined, including DNA 
                                                                                                             
demonstrated a lack of scientific foundation in testing methods, identified serious flaws, and questioned 
the continued use of such techniques. See INNOCENCE PROJECT ARSON REVIEW COMM., REPORT ON THE 
PEER REVIEW OF THE EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE CASES OF STATE OF TEXAS V. CAMERON TODD 
WILLINGHAM AND STATE OF TEXAS V. EARNEST RAY WILLIS 40 (2006) (“The significant lack of 
understanding of the behavior of fire . . . can and does result in significant misinterpretations of fire 
evidence, unreliable determinations, and serious miscarriages of justice with respect to the crime of 
arson.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BALLISTIC IMAGING 3 (Daniel L. Cork et 
al. eds., 2008) (“The validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of 
firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated.”). 
 10. Kelly Servick, Reversing the Legacy of Junk Science in the Courtroom, SCI. MAG. (Mar. 7, 2016, 
4:30 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/reversing-legacy-junk-science-courtroom 
[https://perma.cc/AD3E-LZG7]. 
 11. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON 
METHODS at x (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science
_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XKM-TLG5] [hereinafter PCAST REPORT]. 
 12. See id. at 1–20 (summarizing the Council’s findings and recommendations). 
 13. Id. at 1. Examples of such methods include the analysis of DNA, hair, latent fingerprints, 
firearms and spent ammunition, toolmarks and bitemarks, shoeprints and tire tracks, and handwriting. 
Id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. at 4–5. 
 16. PCAST REPORT, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
 17. Id. 
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analysis, bite marks, latent fingerprints, firearms identification, and 
footwear analysis, the only valid discipline—using both foundational 
and applied validity—was single-sourced DNA analysis, discussed 
below.18 
Technology presents itself as a powerful tool in criminal 
investigations, so it is perhaps predictable that as our consumer 
technology becomes “smarter,” so too does our crime-fighting 
technology. At the same time, efficiency and speed should not be the 
predominant factors in embracing technology, particularly in the 
legal field. The integrity of a criminal trial, and its attendant 
constitutional protections, must be maintained, and a fair trial 
requires that the evidence presented be relevant, reliable, and not 
unduly prejudicial.19 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. at 7–14. The PCAST report received criticism for its findings, most notably from those on the 
prosecutorial side of the aisle. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n, National District 
Attorneys Association Slams President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology Report (Sept. 
2, 2016), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20Press%20Release%20on%20PCAST%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/78ME-W4TC]. PCAST responded in detail, noting: “Forensic science is at a 
crossroads. There is growing recognition that the law requires that a forensic feature-comparison method 
be established as scientifically valid and reliable before it may be used in court and that this requirement 
can only be satisfied by actual empirical testing.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AN ADDENDUM TO THE PCAST REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCE IN 
CRIMINAL COURTS 9 (2017), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensics_adden
dum_finalv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NTR-U2VW]. PCAST also encouraged forensic science to be the 
author of its own destiny. Id. 
 19. William C. Thompson, The Potential for Error in Forensic DNA Testing (and How That 
Complicates the Use of DNA Databases for Criminal Identification) 2 (Aug. 12, 2008) (unpublished 
paper), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/H4T5EOYUZI.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ML9J-EK99]. Indeed, there is recent and ongoing precedent for such a practice. The 
so-called psychopath test is often dispositive as to matters of parole and influential as to sentencing. 
Alix Spiegel, Can a Test Really Tell Who’s a Psychopath?, NPR (May 26, 2011, 2:24 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/05/26/136619689/can-a-test-really-tell-whos-a-psychopath. 
[https://perma.cc/DV9U-5VE9]. The test has even influenced whether the death penalty is administered. 
Id. This use of the test remains pervasive—even though the test’s creator has expressed concern over the 
practice. Ira Glass et al., The Psychopath Test, THIS AM. LIFE (May 27, 2011), 
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/436/the-psychopath-test 
[https://perma.cc/XC8W-P4PV] (interviewing Bob Hare, the test’s creator). 
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B.   Algorithms: Behind the Black Box 
In its most basic form, an algorithm is a series of instructions that 
tells a computer what to do, similar to a recipe that describes how to 
make a particular dish. Algorithms can be reduced to three simple 
operations, not unlike a Westlaw or Lexis search: AND, OR, and 
NOT. That is the basic premise of an algorithm. Of course, the 
complexities increase dramatically from those fundamental operating 
commands. In one way or another, most of these systems are 
examples of machine learning. Such systems do not just repeat a 
stable set of instructions; they rewrite themselves as they work and, 
depending on the software, produce additional algorithms. It is the 
final output of these “self-authored” programs upon which the end 
user relies. 
Using Google Maps as an example, say that you want to go 
shopping at a store located about twenty minutes away. Google Maps 
will use four different algorithms to give you an estimated arrival 
time: (1) by car; (2) on foot; (3) on a bicycle; and (4) on public 
transportation. All four of these algorithms reach the same result—
getting you to the store—but each algorithm does so in a completely 
different way. Each algorithm also has a different cost and a different 
travel time. The same is true in more sophisticated applications of 
algorithms. The precise algorithm being used would be difficult to 
isolate because developers (the humans behind the black box) are 
unique, and thus, the structure and approach of any algorithm will be 
unique from one developer to the next. This only adds to the 
notorious opacity of algorithms and machine learning. 
In the criminal justice arena, the touted advantage to using 
algorithmic software to investigate, prosecute, and sentence offenders 
is the ability to neuter an otherwise subjective process.20 The output 
is meant to be more objective than, for example, a judge, jury, or law 
                                                                                                             
 20. See DANIELLE KEHL ET AL., ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE 
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enforcement official. As a result, the twin goals of maximizing public 
safety and satisfying procedural fairness seem to be met.21 Although 
these are certainly laudable goals, the issue remains: an algorithm is a 
software program that uses specific input to develop a predictive 
method. A known truism of software development is “garbage in, 
garbage out,” which means that the result coming out is only as good 
as the data that went in.22 Applied to software used for criminal 
justice purposes, this principle indicates that biased input from biased 
sources will inevitably lead to biased results. For example, failing to 
control for race in a poorly-optimized algorithm could result in 
sentencing software that gives black defendants inordinately higher 
sentences. Similarly, the same algorithm could overcorrect for gender 
because almost all offenders in prison are male. The sought-after 
neutrality boasted by algorithmic software is a much more difficult 
concept to actualize than it is to espouse. 
The reality is that no algorithm can perfectly produce the optimal 
output, and all predictive software will differ. The disparity between 
the proclaimed advantages of such software and its real-life flaws 
then creates a tension between constitutional fairness and fighting 
crime. Moreover, the complexity of algorithms dissuades questions 
about accuracy; algorithms are perceived or marketed as too difficult 
to understand for either the individuals using them (criminal justice 
stakeholders) or for the people they apply to (defendants and 
prisoners). 
II.   Development Breakthroughs and Run-Time Errors 
The emergence of algorithmic analysis programs creates new 
problems in a legal system increasingly ill-equipped to keep pace. 
The software is pricey, but widespread adoption will decrease the 
costs and will make the programs cheap enough even for smaller 
                                                                                                             
 21. Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness, 23 SIGKDD 
CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 797, 797 (2017), 
http://www.kdd.org/kdd2017/papers/view/algorithmic-decision-making-and-the-cost-of-fairness 
[https://perma.cc/7KUK-XWFE] (click link below abstract to download full article). 
 22. L.J. KUTTEN & FREDERIC M. WILF., 3 COMPUTER SOFTWARE § 12:55 (2017). 
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jurisdictions to afford. Some jurisdictions are employing three of 
these algorithm-based technologies upon which this article will 
focus: probabilistic DNA genotyping, facial recognition, and 
sentencing software. 
A.   Probabilistic Genotyping: Unlocking Pandora’s Box 
In terms of biology, DNA “is the body’s instruction manual.”23 It 
determines everything about an individual, from height to musical 
aptitude.24 Said another way, our DNA determines who we are and 
makes each one of us a unique being.25 Not only does our DNA make 
us unique as individuals, our DNA itself is unique.26 Other than 
identical twins, no two people share the same DNA.27 Because of this 
distinctive quality, forensic scientists can extract DNA from two 
samples and determine if the samples have a high likelihood of being 
from the same source.28 
From its initial development in the 1980s as an identification tool, 
the use of DNA in criminal cases—both to convict defendants and 
exonerate the wrongly convicted—has been prolific. By the 1990s, 
Congress focused on forensic DNA research and development.29 As 
DNA continued to expand its footprint as the ostensible gold standard 
in criminal investigations, an extraordinary amount of federal 
funding allocated to crime labs was specifically earmarked for DNA 
expansion.30 Because of this, research and development of new DNA 
analytical techniques was a lucrative business. Indeed, the abundance 
in funding for DNA collection, testing, and retention far outstripped 
other crime lab allotments, despite the fact that DNA analysis only 
                                                                                                             
 23. D.P. LYLE, FORENSIC SCIENCE 179 (2012). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 187–88. 
 29. Jessica Gabel Cino, Tackling Technical Debt: Managing Advances in DNA Technology That 
Outpace the Evolution of Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 373, 373 (2017). 
 30. Id. 
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represented a small portion of crime lab work at that time.31 Two 
decades later, DNA testing is now a primary hub of many labs, 
forcing other traditional forensic lab departments—such as trace 
evidence or fingerprints—to cut back or close shop.32 
1.   Great in Theory 
DNA remains the gold standard for solving crimes, bolstered by 
academics and verified by scientific studies and experts around the 
world. Since the advent of DNA testing, nearly 200 people have been 
exonerated using newly tested evidence;33 in some places, courts will 
only consider exonerations with DNA evidence.34 Juries, too, have 
become more trusting of DNA, as evidenced by an increased 
likelihood of convictions in cases involving DNA evidence.35 But, as 
the PCAST report notes, “DNA analysis, like all forensic analyses, is 
not infallible in practice.”36 
Many errors in DNA analysis are caused by humans: for example, 
one Texas crime lab was staffed with poorly trained technicians using 
outdated techniques. Others in Texas were found to be “dry-
labbing”—reporting results without doing any actual testing—
leading to inaccurate results and hundreds, if not thousands, of 
subsequent appeals from relevant convictions, including at least one 
capital case.37 But DNA analysis of complex mixtures—the kind that 
                                                                                                             
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (2018), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/YE5W-LV85]. 
 34. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes 
and Rules Governing Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing, 72 A.L.R.6th 227 (2012). 
 35. Joseph L. Peterson et al., Effect of Forensic Evidence on Criminal Justice Case Processing, 58 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. S78, S80 (2013). 
 36. PCAST REPORT, supra note 11, at 7; see also Matthew Shaer, The False Promise of DNA 
Testing, ATLANTIC (June 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/a-reasonable-
doubt/480747/ [https://perma.cc/EA2U-2YBW]. 
 37. Eric Dexheimer, Austin Crime Lab Bucked DNA Standard for Years, Yet Got Passing Grades, 
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Jan. 12, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.mystatesman.com/news/crime—
law/austin-crime-lab-bucked-dna-standard-for-years-yet-got-passing-
grades/MZBboOfzXWWgqlem6867TO/ [https://perma.cc/KB2K-DGYF]; Chuck Lindell, Court: 
Examine If Austin Crime Lab Botched Death Penalty Evidence, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Oct. 18, 
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require probabilistic genotype matching—is particularly error-prone. 
According to the PCAST report, sufficient evidence to establish 
foundational validity for complex mixtures has not yet emerged.38 
When the technology was first developed, DNA matching required 
a significantly intact sample, pure and unpolluted by other bodily 
fluids, also known as single-source DNA.39 As technology has 
improved, more processes, such as probabilistic genotyping, have 
become available to detect DNA in ultra-miniscule amounts; the 
DNA left by a finger touching a glass or even the saliva on a cigarette 
butt is sometimes enough.40 Probabilistic genotyping can analyze 
such small amounts of DNA by using the kind of complex code that 
would be impossible for a human—but not a computer—to run.41 
These processes can also often parse DNA when samples from 
multiple people are mixed together.42 Through probabilistic genotype 
matching, programs like TrueAllele and STRMIX claim to reliably 
identify individual DNA strands presented in a multi-contributor or 
otherwise-dirty biological morass.43 
The scientifically tested methods of polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) and short tandem repeat (STR) differ in several respects from 
probabilistic genotyping testing, which uses a smaller—sometimes 
degraded, sometimes mixed—sample.44 Probabilistic genotyping thus 
requires more subjective profile interpretation on the part of an 
analyst.45 Profile interpretation is perhaps the most troubling feature 
                                                                                                             
2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.statesman.com/news/court-examine-austin-crime-lab-botched-death-
penalty-evidence/Fue0LIlp74CTWSUXoSrXuO/ [https://perma.cc/9DGR-FQV3]. 
 38. PCAST REPORT, supra note 11, at 8. 
 39. Id. at 70. 
 40. The Problem of Probabilistic Genotyping, FORENSIC INST. (Apr. 2017), 
http://www.theforensicinstitute.com/news-articles/views-and-opinions/dna-interpretation-software 
[https://perma.cc/5BB5-XVNW]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Mark W. Perlin et al., TrueAllele Genotype Identification on DNA Mixtures Containing Up to 
Five Unknown Contributors, 60 J. FORENSIC SCI. 857, 857 (2015). 
 44. Frederick R. Bieber et al., Evaluation of Forensic DNA Mixture Evidence: Protocol for 
Evaluation, Interpretation, and Statistical Calculations Using the Combined Probability of Inclusion, 17 
BMC GENETICS 1, 1–4 (2016). 
 45. People v. Megnath, 898 N.Y.S.2d 408, 413 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
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of probabilistic genotyping because it inherently creates the greatest 
potential for human error. Profile interpretation involves a hazardous 
assumption about which alleles are or are not present. Once the 
profile is compiled by the machine component of the DNA analysis, 
the forensic scientist must manually interpret that profile.46 The 
increased number of amplification cycles injects many variables in 
the profiles.47 The forensic scientist interpreting the sample must 
account for these variables.48 Thus, different forensic scientists may 
interpret the resulting profiles differently; this creates a near-
impossible hurdle for a criminal defendant to overcome, especially if 
probabilistic genotyping is the sole DNA evidence used because it is 
nearly impossible to challenge. 
In the early 1990s, much of the work in the DNA field focused on 
single-source DNA profiles and sought to achieve an exact match 
between the crime scene sample and the suspect’s sample.49 Later in 
the 1990s, Cybergenetics, a bioinformation company, began focusing 
on forensic technology and patented various algorithms that promised 
to discriminate and separate the presence of individual DNA profiles 
from a sample that might include several people’s biological 
products.50 The tool, called TrueAllele, promises an unparalleled 
advantage in criminal investigations. TrueAllele’s marketing material 
guarantees its results are free of subjective error and bias.51 The 
founder of Cybergenetics quickly became an outspoken advocate and 
salesman for the tool’s use, and by 2009, the first TrueAllele case 
reached a courtroom.52 At the end of the day, however, 
                                                                                                             
 46. Bruce Budowle et al., A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic Sciences 
and Direction for Continuing Advancement, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 798, 803–04 (2009). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Jessica Pishko, The Impenetrable Program Transforming How Courts Treat DNA Evidence, 
WIRED (Nov. 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/trueallele-software-transforming-how-
courts-treat-dna-evidence [https://perma.cc/RF5E-6VFF]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. LAW SERVICES, CYBERGENETICS, 
https://www.cybgen.com/solutions/brochures/law_brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/23YX-MANE] (last 
visited May 12, 2018). 
 52. Pishko, supra note 49. 
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Cybergenetics is a business with the goal of making money. Because 
it is a private, for-profit business, TrueAllele comes with a high price 
tag. A license to use TrueAllele costs $60,000.53 But the very thing 
that makes tools like TrueAllele valuable to courts—their ability to 
make connections that elude humans—also makes it difficult for 
those courts to assess the product’s validity. 
2.   Problems in Execution 
In 2017, a ProPublica investigation uncovered aspects of the 
probabilistic software used by New York City forensic labs that 
might make the results unreliable.54 As New York forensic labs 
switched to STRmix—another probabilistic software—a coalition of 
criminal defense attorneys called for the New York State Inspector 
General to investigate the lab.55 Similarly, in 2014, a judge found that 
STRmix contained coding errors involving certain mixtures of three-
person DNA samples, which contributed to misleading results.56 
After the incident, STRmix released the algorithm publicly.57 But the 
cofounder of STRmix, John Buckleton, believes the algorithm is far 
too complex for lawyers to unpack and determine whether the tool is 
free from error or bias.58 Keeping the code public may quell critics of 
the black box but does little to assist in determining what inputs were 
used in its programming.59 
TrueAllele is under the microscope more than ever before. 
Attorneys representing Billy Ray Johnson, a currently incarcerated 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. 
 54. Lauren Kirchner, Thousands of Criminal Cases in New York Relied on Disputed DNA Testing 
Techniques, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 4, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/thousands-of-
criminal-cases-in-new-york-relied-on-disputed-dna-testing-techniques [https://perma.cc/49SV-MZTL]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. David Murray, Queensland Authorities Confirm ‘Miscode’ Affects DNA Evidence in Criminal 




 57. Pishko, supra note 49. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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man who claims he was wrongfully convicted based on evidence 
processed by TrueAllele, are not so quick to accept Cybergenetics’ 
assurances of accuracy.60 In a newsletter, Cybergenetics writes about 
the Johnson case, saying that TrueAllele obtained results for eight 
samples where other methods found the results “inconclusive.”61 This 
should give anyone pause. But the newsletter further states that guilty 
pleas regularly follow TrueAllele’s interpretation of previously 
inconclusive DNA samples.62 This has caused the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) to intervene. As the ACLU indicates in its 
amicus brief for Johnson, the companies writing and selling 
algorithms like TrueAllele often serve the prosecution as their 
primary client, and—whether explicitly stated or not—that client is 
often best satisfied with more matches.63 With such an incentive 
structure in place, it may be naïve to take Cybergenetics’ assertions at 
face value. 
Further, Johnson’s lawyers argue that the source code is crucial to 
their defense even if TrueAllele’s motives are entirely benign.64 The 
claim that any algorithmic software such as TrueAllele is able to 
make decisions entirely detached from human bias is not based in 
reality.65 From the bottom up, an algorithm must interpret large 
amounts of data and quantify the relevance of each piece; such a 
process is largely subjective, and algorithms merely apply a uniform 
level of subjectivity across the board.66 In addition to built-in human 
bias, almost all software carries an expected number of programming 
                                                                                                             
 60. Vera Eidelman, Secret Algorithms Are Deciding Criminal Trials and We’re Not Even Allowed to 
Test Their Accuracy, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 15, 2017, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/secret-algorithms-are-deciding-
criminal-trials-and [https://perma.cc/F8Z7-UKQ8]. 
 61. Jeffrey K. Robinson, Cybergenetics June/July 2015 Newsletter (2015), 
http://www.duq.edu/assets/Documents/forensics/CybgenNewsJuneJuly2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ84-
GVLS]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Civil Liberties Union & Am. Civil Liberties Union S. Cal. in Support 
of Defendant-Appellant Seeking Reversal at 15–16, California v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Sept. 14, 2017). 
 64. Id. at 22. 
 65. Id. at 12. 
 66. Id. at 12–13. 
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errors in the source code.67 Even conservative estimates suggest that 
more than a dozen material errors are hidden amongst TrueAllele’s 
thousands of lines of code.68 
Johnson’s case is just one of many that used TrueAllele or similar 
systems from other developers that promise their proprietary software 
will reveal all the secrets of DNA. But Johnson’s lawyers—along 
with the ACLU, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Northern 
California Innocence Project—are making the case that the trial 
court’s decision not to allow defense experts to examine the source 
code prevented Johnson from receiving a fair trial.69 Jennifer 
Friedman, the forensic expert for the Los Angeles Public Defender’s 
Office, which also submitted a brief in the Johnson trial, compared 
the shift from single-source DNA to probabilistic DNA analysis to 
the difference between algebra and calculus.70 
In trial documents in other cases, TrueAllele’s front man Mark 
Perlin argues that allowing others to see his company’s source code 
would violate his right to a trade secret and ultimately threaten his 
business.71 He casts unlocking the code as unnecessary because his 
company performs its own quality control.72 Perlin complains that the 
ACLU (and others) are just trying to “sow[] confusion” over an 
“unbiased system.”73 
Despite Cybergenetics’ apparent dread of being compelled to 
reveal its trade secret, TrueAllele recently promised to make the code 
accessible to defense attorneys for a mere $10,000, plus $2,000 a 
day.74 This “generosity” is entirely self-serving—it preserves 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. at 15. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 63, at 29. 
 70. Pishko, supra note 49. 
 71. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Defense Motion to Compel Cybergenetics’ 
TrueAllele Casework Source Code at 5, Washington v. Fair, No. 10-1-09274-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 
12, 2017). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Press Release, Cybergentics, ACLU Zealots March Against Truth-Seeking DNA Technology 
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2017/sep/ACLU-zealots-march-
against-truth-seeking-DNA-technology.shtml [https://perma.cc/CAU7-7S8E]. 
 74. See Pishko, supra note 49. 
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Cybergenetics’ profit margin while shortchanging defendants who 
lack the financial resources to afford such a measure. 
In October, the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that it would embark 
on a study to determine the reliability of DNA testing, including the 
algorithmic methods used by companies like TrueAllele.75 
Expectedly, Perlin condemned this research, which NIST says serves 
to establish foundational validity (something the PCAST report noted 
has been lacking) of the methodology.76 Perlin met this 
announcement with hostility aimed at external peer review (a 
foundational requisite for scientific validation) and derided the study 
as a governmental attack on science.77 Perlin vehemently argued that 
prior scientific, peer-reviewed research studies had verified 
TrueAllele’s validity.78 Of course, the studies that Perlin relied on 
were self-serving, internal validation studies sponsored and 
conducted by Cybergenetics.79 
The chief DNA scientist at NIST, Dr. John Butler, is a preeminent 
DNA expert80 who understands the issues related to probabilistic 
DNA analysis. Butler explained that the NIST study focused on 
measuring and evaluating differentiations in software responses.81 
                                                                                                             
 75. NIST to Assess the Reliability of Forensic Methods for Analyzing DNA Mixtures, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2017/10/nist-assess-
reliability-forensic-methods-analyzing-dna-mixtures [https://perma.cc/PRP4-5JXF]. 
 76. Id.; see also Press Release, Cybergenetics, NIST Launches Wasteful Study That Undermines 
Science and Justice (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2017/oct/NIST-
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 77. Press Release, supra note 76; see also NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., VALIDATION 
STANDARDS FOR PROBABILISTIC GENOTYPING SYSTEMS 8–9 (2016), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/10/13/validation_standards_for_probabilistic_g
enotyping_systems_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/83RM-9NQA]. 
 78. TrueAllele, Virginia TrueAllele Validation Study: Casework Comparison, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jS4tHVkb87k&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/VPY9-
KFMD]. 
 79. Id.; TrueAllele, Practical Aspects of the Implementation of TrueAllele Casework, YOUTUBE 
(July 29, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Qoetze3fkE [https://perma.cc/4GTG-5JNX]. 
 80. John Butler, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Apr. 4, 2017), 
https://www.nist.gov/people/john-butler [https://perma.cc/D8EL-TM2R]. 
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Dr. Mike Coble at NIST, an expert on forensic sciences who has 
published his own studies on probabilistic genotyping,82 explained 
that NIST’s research focused on the practice of mixture evaluations 
as a whole rather than on individual companies.83 Coble explained 
that the study is aimed at education across the criminal justice 
system—lawyers, judges, and juries: “There’s a real hunger and 
desire to understand what’s going on in that box, what the program is 
doing[,] and how does it do this.”84 
Information and transparency is sorely needed, but is it enough? 
Even the best defense lawyers may lack the resources and 
foundational knowledge needed to parse the nuances of the 
technology into flaws. Beyond the resource gap is the fundamental 
issue of a criminal defendant’s right to due process. TrueAllele could 
be garbage or gospel, but that should not change a defendant’s right 
to see what is in the box that could put him or her away for life.85 
B.   Facial Recognition Software 
The Trump administration’s efforts to impose new immigration 
rules drew attention—and legal fire—for restrictions placed on the 
ability of people born in certain majority Muslim countries to enter 
the U.S.86 In the frenzy of concern, one obscure provision of the 
executive orders was given little attention: an expansion of facial 
recognition systems in major U.S. airports to monitor people leaving 
the U.S. in hopes of catching individuals who have overstayed their 
visas or are wanted in criminal investigations.87 
                                                                                                             
 82. See Michael Coblei, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., https://strbase.nist.gov/Coble.htm 
[https://perma.cc/46YD-ZNR8] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). 
 83. Pishko, supra note 49. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Laura Jarrett, Trump Administration Appealing Halt of Revised Travel Ban, CNN (Mar. 30, 
2017, 6:15 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/29/politics/hawaii-trump-travel-ban-extended 
[https://perma.cc/A5WU-HGVJ]; Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration, Annotated, NPR (Jan. 31, 
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This type of facial recognition is essentially a much more powerful 
version of the same type of technology your phone or computer 
might use to identify friends in your photos, and the possible 
applications are extensive.88 Using computers to recognize people’s 
faces and validate their identities can streamline access control for 
secure corporate and government buildings or devices.89 Some 
systems can identify known or suspected criminals.90 Businesses can 
analyze their customers’ faces to help tailor marketing strategies to 
people of different genders, ages, and ethnic backgrounds.91 Even 
some consumer product companies are taking advantage of facial 
recognition technology through services such as virtual eyeglass 
fitting.92 
Serious privacy concerns are also raised as government agencies 
and companies are better able to track individuals through their 
communities and even around the world. The facial recognition 
market is currently worth approximately $4 billion and is expected to 
grow to more than $7 billion by 2022.93 Surveillance is a large reason 
for growth, and government entities are the primary consumers in the 
market.94 The FBI has a database with images of approximately half 
the U.S. population.95 Some commentators have expressed fear of 
                                                                                                             
immigration-order-vastly-expands-border-surveillance [https://perma.cc/968B-H6R5]. 
 88. iPhoto ‘09 & iPhoto ‘11: Improving Face Recognition Results, APPLE SUPPORT (May 6, 2016), 
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201891 [https://perma.cc/RAX6-NCU7]. 
 89. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-621, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: 
COMMERCIAL USES, PRIVACY ISSUES, AND APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW 9 (2015). 
 90. Id. at 8. 
 91. Id. at 9. 
 92. Frederico Viticci, iPhone App with Face Tracking Technology Lets You Try Virtual Glasses, 
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people using facial recognition to engage in online harassment or 
even real-world stalking.96 
As facial recognition becomes more common, we must know how 
it works. As someone who studies and researches the legal 
implications of new technology in criminal investigations, I believe it 
is important to understand what it can and cannot do and how the 
technology is progressing. Only then can we have informed 
discussions about when and how to use computers to recognize that 
most human of features—our faces. 
1.   Great in Theory 
As one of several methods of what are called “biometric” 
identification systems, facial recognition examines physical features 
of a person’s body in an attempt to uniquely distinguish one person 
from all the others.97 Other forms of this type of work include 
fingerprint matching, retina scanning, and even voice recognition.98 
All of these systems take in data—often an image—from an 
unknown person, analyze the data in that input, and attempt to match 
the individual to existing entries in a database of known persons’ 
faces or voices.99 Facial recognition does this in three steps: 
detection, faceprint creation, and verification or identification.100 
                                                                                                             
 96. Jeff John Roberts, Our Facial Recognition Nightmare Is Upon Us, FORTUNE (May 20, 2016), 
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When an image is captured, computer software analyzes it to 
identify where the faces are in, say, a crowd of people.101 In a mall, 
for example, security cameras will feed into a computer with facial 
recognition software to identify faces in the video feed.102 Once the 
system has identified any potential faces in an image, it looks more 
closely at each face.103 Sometimes the image must be reoriented or 
resized.104 A face very close to the camera may seem tilted or 
stretched slightly; someone farther from the camera may appear 
smaller or even partially hidden from view.105 
When the software has arrived at a proper size and orientation for 
the face, it looks even more closely, seeking to create what is called a 
faceprint.106 Much like a fingerprint record, a faceprint is a set of 
characteristics that, taken together, uniquely identify one person’s 
face. Elements of a faceprint include the relative locations of facial 
features such as eyes, eyebrows, and nose shape.107 A person who has 
small eyes, thick eyebrows, and a long narrow nose will have a very 
different faceprint from someone with large eyes, thin eyebrows, and 
a wide nose. Eyes are a key factor in accuracy.108 Large dark 
sunglasses are more likely to reduce the accuracy of the software 
than facial hair or regular prescription glasses.109 
A faceprint can be compared with a single photo to verify the 
identity of a known person, such as an employee seeking to enter a 
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secure area.110 Faceprints can also be compared to databases of many 
images in hopes of identifying an unknown person.111 
2.   Problems in Execution 
Lighting is a key factor affecting how well facial recognition 
works.112 An evenly lit face seen directly from the front, with no 
shadows and nothing blocking the camera’s view, is best.113 In 
addition, whether an image of a face contrasts well with its 
background, and how far away it is from the camera, can help or hurt 
the facial recognition process.114 Uneven light, a bad angle, or a 
strange expression can cause facial recognition to fail.115 
Another very important challenge to successful facial recognition 
is the degree to which the person being identified cooperates with—
or is even aware of—the process. People who know they are using 
facial recognition, such as the employee trying to access a restricted 
room, are relatively easy to work with.116 They know to look directly 
at the camera in proper lighting to make conditions optimal for the 
software analysis.117 Others do not know their faces are being 
analyzed and may not even know that these systems are surveilling 
them at all. Images of their faces are trickier to analyze; a face picked 
out of a crowd may have to be digitally transformed and zoomed in 
on before the software can generate a faceprint.118 That leaves more 
room for the system to misidentify the person.119 
When a facial recognition system incorrectly identifies a person, 
the misidentification can cause a number of potential problems 
depending on what kind of error has occurred. A system restricting 
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access to a specific location could wrongly admit an unauthorized 
person—if, say, she were wearing a disguise or even just looked 
similar enough to someone who should be allowed in. Or it could 
block the entry of an authorized person by failing to correctly 
identify her. 
In law enforcement, surveillance cameras cannot always obtain 
good-quality images of a suspect’s face. That could mean identifying 
an innocent person as a suspect or even failing to recognize a known 
criminal who ran afoul of the law again. Regardless of how accurate 
facial recognition appears to be on television crime dramas, room for 
error exists, although the technology is improving. The NIST has 
estimated that stated error rates are declining by 50% every two 
years, and tests show they are currently around 0.8%.120 That is better 
than voice recognition, which has error rates above 6%.121 But facial 
recognition may still be more error-prone than iris scanning and 
fingerprint scanning.122 
Even if it is accurate, however, facial recognition raises privacy 
concerns—perhaps even more so as accuracy improves.123 One of the 
chief worries is that, much like the rise of DNA databases, facial 
features and photos are being warehoused by government agencies, 
enabling them to track people and erase any notion of privacy or 
anonymity.124 New privacy issues are cropping up all of the time. A 
new smartphone app, FindFace, allows people to take a person’s 
photo and use facial recognition to find their social media 
accounts.125 Ostensibly a convenient way to connect with friends and 
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coworkers, the app invites misuse. People can use it to expose 
identities and harass others.126 
These new capabilities also raise concerns about other malicious 
uses of publicly available images. For example, when police issue 
alerts about missing children, they often include a photograph of the 
child’s face. There is little regulation or oversight, so nobody knows 
whether those images are also being entered into facial recognition 
systems.127 This, of course, does not even delve into issues such as 
using facial recognition tools along with other technologies, 
including police body cameras, geolocation software, and machine 
learning to assist in real-time tracking.128 That goes beyond simple 
identification and into the realm of where someone has been and 
where the software predicts that person will go. Combining 
technologies offers attractive options for crime fighting and deepens 
the fissures in our privacy. 
C.   Sentencing Software: Prepackaged Risk Assessment 
Risk and Needs Assessment (RNA) is another iteration in the 
criminal justice system’s continued goal of managing increasing 
incarceration rates with a limited budget through the use of 
technological advancements. RNA’s original iteration, the selective 
incapacitation movement, started in the 1980s mostly as a criminal 
justice theory.129 The concept behind the theory was to identify and 
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incarcerate individuals prone to violence or recidivism for longer 
periods, thereby leading to an overall reduction in the crime rate.130 
As with many new, innovative systems, the selective incapacitation 
system had serious flaws—the most notable of which were its 
incredibly high false positive rates, which mistakenly identified 
between fifty-four and ninety-nine percent of participating 
individuals as “dangerous.”131 
Although the theory of selective incapacitation was quickly 
abandoned, its core concepts took root in legal literature, the broad 
theory being refined into the utilitarian goal of decreasing the crime 
rate by imprisoning the most dangerous felons while reducing mass 
incarceration.132 The American system shifted to using clearer 
sentencing practices and increased the use of sentencing guidelines, 
culminating in Congress passing the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) 
in 1984, from which the federal sentencing guidelines are derived.133 
The main theory behind the SRA was that sentencing practices had 
become unfair and uncertain under the rehabilitative model; thus, the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission formalized federal sentencing.134 
1.   Great in Theory 
With a methodological and testable system instead of a purely 
theoretical conception, an evidence-based “risk/needs assessment” 
was at least ready to be tested out in practice and implemented into 
the sentencing process.135 As of 2014, at least twelve states had 
integrated some form of RNA tool into their sentencing procedures 
through legislation, state sentencing policy, or a state supreme court 
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decision.136 The process, as applied to the criminal justice system, 
focuses on grouping offenders as low, medium, or high-risk 
offenders; sentencing and treatment guidelines are assigned based on 
these groupings.137 
Although each RNA model uses its own algorithm or gives 
different weight to an offender’s risk factors, the models generally try 
to embrace rehabilitation while still providing the standards and 
predictability of the retributive philosophy.138 Furthermore, most 
RNA tools are based on the risk-needs-responsivity model (RNR), 
which itself is based on the three eponymous principles: the risk 
principle, which asserts that risk is predictable and offenders should 
be treated differently based on the risk grouping; the needs principle, 
which purports that rehabilitation and sentencing should be based on 
the needs that contribute to criminal behavior; and the responsivity 
principle, which describes how treatments should respond to each 
specific offender.139 
Perhaps the most comprehensive categorization of the goals 
pursued by RNA tools is to (1) reduce judicial disparity; (2) promote 
consistent sentencing; (3) prioritize and allocate correctional 
resources; (4) adjust punishments for certain categories of offenders; 
(5) reduce prison overcrowding; and (6) encourage the use of non-
incarceration sanctions.140 Still, it is possible that different tools use 
modified or completely different principles, and depending on the 
system’s algorithmic confidentiality, it may be impossible to know 
exactly what principles a specific tool prioritizes when determining 
an offender’s risk group and ultimate sentence. 
For example, the Northpointe Institute for Public Management’s 
Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
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Sanctions—better known as COMPAS—was developed in 1998 and 
was last updated in 2005.141 COMPAS is currently being used by 
departments of corrections and rehabilitation in California, Michigan, 
New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.142 It is worth noting that only corrections departments 
have used COMPAS in their procedures, while courts have either 
been disallowed from using it or unimpressed by its results.143 Due to 
this system’s prolific use, however, and its use as evidence in the 
fairly recent Loomis case, discussed below, the system will be 
evaluated on its merits as a decision-making tool for judges as well as 
for corrections officers. 
COMPAS contains 43 separate scales formed from 135 risk items, 
which can be mixed and matched to different offender populations at 
different points of the criminal justice system to make a custom-built 
risk assessment for the particular department in question.144 The risk 
items and scales are picked and formed by instrument developers, 
reflecting the fact that COMPAS is a company secret and that most 
of its algorithmic methodology is unknown.145 The creators, 
however, do assert that their risk and needs factors include the eight 
normative subgroups that are utilized by many other risk analysis 
systems.146 Although COMPAS still keeps its precise methodology 
and algorithm as a trade secret, this alignment with similar systems 
gives scholars a reference point as to COMPAS’s approach. 
It bears noting that, at least in Wisconsin courts, COMPAS must 
include the following five written warnings to judges reviewing a 
case with the assistance of a COMPAS risk score readout: (1) the 
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proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents the disclosure of how the 
risk scores are formulated; (2) COMPAS risk scores cannot identify 
specific high-risk offenders due to its scores being derived from 
group data; (3) COMPAS relies on a national data sample and has not 
been cross-validated with a Wisconsin population; (4) studies have 
warned that COMPAS disproportionately classifies minority 
offenders as having a higher risk of recidivism; and (5) COMPAS 
was developed specifically to help correctional departments in post-
sentencing determinations.147 Despite these warnings, particularly the 
fifth warning, Wisconsin courts are allowed to take risk scores into 
consideration during presentencing determinations, and any legal and 
constitutional objections raised have proven unsuccessful to bar the 
use of risk scores.148 
2.   Problems in Execution 
This leads to an underlying, pervasive ambiguity regarding the 
quintessential measuring factor of all RNA tools, calling their 
effectiveness into question. With such an imprecise measure of the 
core assessment standards of RNA tools, the system seems to 
function as junk science protected behind the wizard’s curtain. This 
assessment is supported by a recent study which found that 
crowdsourced predictions from a random survey were more accurate 
at predicting rates of recidivism than those from COMPAS, even 
though the survey-takers based their decisions off only two factors 
(COMPAS uses 137 inputs, including 6 risk factors in its 
assessment).149 Yet, the lack of an empirically watertight basis is not 
enough to discard a system from the court of law, as expressed by the 
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Supreme Court in Heller v. Doe when it said, “[t]he problems of 
government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, 
rough accommodations—[however] illogical, it may be, and 
unscientific.”150 On this point, courts across the nation have been 
clear: just because the system is incapable of scientifically 
identifying with certainty an individual’s chance of recidivism does 
not by itself invalidate the use of RNA tools in the sentencing 
process.151 
The RNA algorithms lack the ability to control for several 
contingent factors. For example, the tendency of the tools to overrate 
male minorities over other offenders should automatically be a red 
flag. Some studies suggest that such factors cannot be controlled for, 
and the use of RNA tools will only aggravate the prison population’s 
racial imbalance.152 This capacity for algorithmic software to develop 
racial prejudices is well-documented.153 For example, at first glance, 
Microsoft’s @TayTweets, a quirky artificial intelligence-based 
Twitter account that learned to produce racist responses in 
conversation after less than twenty-four hours of live interaction with 
the Twitter universe, seemed like a comical mistake.154 
When the same principle applies to RNA programs that commonly 
learn the same prejudices and consequently issue disproportionate 
recommendations or assessments to defendants of color, however, it 
is time to stop laughing.155 Harsher critics point out that prior 
criminal history is merely a proxy for race and that the adoption of 
RNA tools would exacerbate such an issue.156 Professor Bernard 
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Harcourt, in a forthcoming paper, examines previous actuarial 
assessments of the criminal population to tackle high rates of 
incarceration, including such assessments as early selective 
incapacitation, which resulted in a sharp increase in black 
representation in detention and incarceration.157 Harcourt further 
notes that, as RNA tools have developed and evolved, the number of 
factors considered, as well as the increased focus on prior criminal 
history as a main factor in evaluation, has led to the further unequal 
targeting of blacks over other races.158 
Gender is another difficult measurement factor, although for 
different reasons. Usually dismissed as a verified correlation, there 
are recognized and significant gender disparities in recidivism rates 
and rehabilitation potential.159 The case cited in the Loomis decision, 
Craig v. Boren, stands as a seminal case concerning the 
unconstitutionality of using gender discrimination in lawmaking; 
however, like in Loomis, courts have often not considered the 
statistical use of gender in actuarial studies as an unconstitutional 
procedure.160 As such, gender as a factor in RNA tools remains 
permissible, with any potential constitutional issues placated, if it is 
sufficiently reinforced with proper statistical evidence. 
Subjective bias in judicial decisions setting bail or sentences 
should obviously be avoided, but no magic switch can be flipped to 
resolve the problem. RNA software is constructed by imperfect 
people, and their prejudices often spill over into their work despite 
even the best intentions. As that same software executes machine 
learning, the potential for substantial unfairness increases with its 
level of exposure. Although RNA software is promoted as a shift 
from biased practices to objective decision-making, without greater 
transparency and scrutiny, it merely hides the same biases from 
public view without diminishing their influence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Algorithms are becoming an integral part of the criminal justice 
system, ultimately influencing a person’s decision on the freedom or 
incarceration of a defendant. Algorithms are complex, difficult to 
understand, and often a mystery to pull apart, understood only by the 
company selling the algorithmic program. Currently, most are 
protected behind the cloak of trade secret, despite Confrontation 
Clause and other constitutional concerns. 
In the end, the parties using algorithms in their decision-making 
processes must rely on the assumption that the programs’ creators 
balanced public safety and fairness to ethical levels. Basic machine 
learning techniques are already being used in the criminal justice 
system. Further, the not-far-off role of artificial intelligence in our 
courts creates two potential paths for the criminal justice and legal 
communities: either blindly allow the march of technology to go 
forward, or create a moratorium on the use of opaque technologies in 
criminal justice risk assessment until processes and procedures 
allowing for a meaningful examination of these tools are in place. 
The legal community has never fully discussed the implications of 
algorithmic tools. Now, attorneys and judges are grappling with the 
lack of oversight and the impact of these tools after their 
proliferation. To hit pause would allow courts time to create rules 
governing how algorithmic software can and should be used. It 
would give policymakers the window necessary to create standards 
and provide a mechanism for oversight. Finally, it would allow 
educational and advocacy organizations time to teach attorneys how 
to properly handle these novel tools in court. 
These steps can reinforce the rule of law and protect individual 
rights. We should remember Melvin Kranzberg’s first law of 
technology: it is neither good nor bad, but it certainly is not 
neutral.161 His sixth law of technology is equally relevant: 
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“Technology is a very human activity.”162 To blindly accept these 
algorithm-driven technologies in our courts without a plan is to defer 
to machines in a way that should make any advocate of judicial or 
prosecutorial discretion uncomfortable. Technology provides 
powerful tools, but the law is often ill-equipped to keep pace with 
new developments. If we are to use these technologies when life and 
liberty are at stake, we must engage with its possibilities and its 
detriments and understand the issues of accuracy, fairness, and ethics 
these new capabilities raise. 
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